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Essay

Congress, the Supreme Court, and Enemy
Combatants: How Lawmakers Buoyed
Judicial Supremacy by Placing Limits on
Federal Court Jurisdiction
Neal Devinst
By turning a statute limiting court jurisdiction into a delegation of power by Congress to the Supreme Court, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld 1 is a political masterstroke. In the pages that follow,
I explain why "the least dangerous branch" felt empowered to
ignore congressional limits on its authority, repudiate
presidentially created military tribunals, and conclude that the
Geneva Convention applies to Guanbinamo detainees. In so doing, I will use the Court's Hamdan ruling to extend my contribution to last year's Minnesota Law Review Symposium on the
future of the Supreme Court. In that Essay, Should the Supreme Court Fear Congress?, I examined recent proposals to
strip court jurisdiction on divisive social issues and concluded
that the Supreme Court has little reason to fear a backlash
from Congress.2 For identical reasons, the Hamdan Court had
no reason to fear Congress. Congress never challenged judicial
independence when it enacted legislation limiting federal court
jurisdiction over enemy combatants. In making this point, I will
look at the politics both surrounding the 2005 Detainee Treat-

t Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of
William and Mary. Thanks to the Minnesota Law Review for encouraging me
to write a follow up to Should the Supreme Court Fear Congress?, 90 MINN. L.
REV. 1337 (2006). Thanks also to my able research assistants, Svetlana
Khvalina, John Miller, and Allison Sawyer. Thanks, finally, to Lou Fisher and
Jeff Powell for commenting on an earlier version of this Essay. Copyright
© 2007 by Neal Devins.
1. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
2. Neal Devins, Should the Supreme Court Fear Congress?, 90 MINN. L.
REV. 1337, 1361-62 (2006).
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ment Act (limiting court power over Guantanamo detainees)3
and the 2006 Military Commissions Act (forbidding habeas filings by enemy combatants).4
This Essay does not address whether the Hamdan decision
is correct on the merits. It may be that lawless hubris animated
the Court's refusal to defer to executive branch interpretations
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and other relevant statutes.s That animation, however, is not my concern. Instead, I
will look at Hamdan as a work of political strategy-examining
why the Court would have incentive to see Bush administration
initiatives as executive overreaching and, similarly, why the
Court would want to see Congress as its ally.
My essay proceeds in two parts. First, I examine congressional efforts to restrict court jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees. Specifically, I explain why Congress never saw these
statutes as challenging the Court's power to decide the enemy
combatant issue. More generally, I argue that Congress has no
interest in challenging the Court to a knock-down fight . Second, I discuss Hamdan, focusing on the Court's assessment of
how Congress and the Court should interface with each other.
In particular, I highlight the reasons why the Court would
want to protect (if not expand) its institutional turf and, in so
doing, limit the executive.
I. CONGRESS AND THE COURT
A. BACKGROUND

A trio of June 2004 cases set into motion the CourtCongress dialogue that produced statutory restrictions on court
jurisdiction both before and after Hamdan. The most consequential of these cases is Rasul v. Bush, a decision rejecting
Bush administration efforts to block federal court review of habeas claims filed by Guantanamo detainees.6 The Bush admini3. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006,
119 Stat. 2739.
4. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600.
5. For a condemnation of Hamdan , see Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan
v. Ruinsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 101 (2006) . For a celebration of the decision, see Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes
to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65 (2006).
6. 542 u.s. 466, 481 (2004).
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stration argued that habeas relief was inappropriate because
the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo is under Cuban, not U.S.,
sovereignty. 7 In rejecting that argument,s the Supreme Court
signaled its willingness to police the administration's handling
of enemy combatants. At the same time, the Court ruled
against the government in another case involving U.S. citizens
detained on terrorism charges.9 Rejecting the government's
claim that it can detain captured al Qaeda members and Taliban indefinitely, the Court ruled that the Constitution "most
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake" and that enemy combatants must
have access to a lawyer and a "fair opportunity to rebut the
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decision
maker." 10
The results and rhetoric of these cases represent a significant break from past practice. In the fifty years since the Court
rejected President Truman's seizure of the steel mills in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,n the Court regularly
acquiesced to presidential war-making initiatives.l2 In its 2004
rulings, however, the Court flatly rejected the government's position that separation of powers principles "mandate a heavily
circumscribed role for the courts."l3 A state of war, as Justice
O'Connor put it, "is not a blank check for the President when it
comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens." 14

7. Id. at 475-76.
8. Id. at 480-81. The Supreme Court determined that the district court
needed jurisdiction over the detainee's custodian to reach the detainee, regardless of the detainee's citizenship or location. In this case, the ultimate custodian was Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. I d. at 4 78-83.
9. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004). A third case, Rumsfeld v. Padilla also raised the question of whether the President had the power
to detain a U .S. citizen militarily. 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004) . The Court, ruling
5:4, concluded that Padilla had filed his action in the wrong court. Id.
10. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533, 536. In her Hamdi opinion, Justice O'Connor
suggested that a wholly executive body, including one made of military officers, could satisfy her demand for a "neutral decisonmaker." See id. at 532-35.
11. 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952).
12. See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 272-74 (2d ed. 2004);
Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, The Steel Seizure Case: One of a Kind?, 19
CONST. COMMENT. 63, 75-83 (2002); Louis Fisher, Judicial Review of the War
Power, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 466, 484-88 (2005).
13. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535.
14. Id. at 536.
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Five interrelated phenomena-most of which were also at
play in Hamdan-fueled the Court's rulings in these cases.15
First, the Rehnquist Court worked hard to protect its turf. In
other contexts, rather than shying away from political battles,
the Court has embraced the rhetoric of judicial supremacy.1s
Contending that Congress must adhere to the Court's interpretations of the Constitution, for example, the Justices rejected
congressional efforts to mandate state accommodations for religious minorities17 and the disabled.lS Second, the Bush administration staked out an extreme position in these cases (and related war on terror initiatives).19 By arguing that the president
has final and unreviewable authority over military detainees
held outside this country, the administration claimed that it
could do with Guantanamo detainees as it saw fit. Echoing the
Truman administration's claim in Youngstown that the only
checks on presidential excess were "the ballot box and ... impeachment,"20 the administration tried to back the Court into a
corner.
Third, administration efforts to assuage the Court at oral
arguments backfired. Contending that the "last thing you want
to do is torture somebody or try to do something along those
lines,"21 the administration argued that it could be trusted. The
very day the Court heard oral arguments, however, the media
released photographs of U.S. soldiers torturing Iraqi prisoners
at Abu Ghraib prison.22 Making matters worse, the press subsequently revealed that the Justice Department had crafted a
15. See infra Part II.
16. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism
and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2036-37 (2003); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The
Rehnquist Court at Twilight: The Lures and Perils of Split-the-Difference Jurisprudence, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1969, 1969 (2006). For additional discussion, see
infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
17. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U .S. 507, 535-36 (1997).
18. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U .S. 356, 374 (2001).
19. Linda Greenhouse, Detention Cases Before Supreme Court Will Test
Limits of Presidential Power, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at A20 (suggesting
that the administration weakened its legal position by taking extreme positions on presidential power).
20. Devins & Fisher, supra note 12, at 6S-69 (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 82534, at 371 (1952)). For additional discussion linking Hamdan to Youngstown,
see infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
21. Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U .S. 507
(2004) (No. 03-6696).
22. See Charles Lane, Iraqi Prison Abuse May Hurt Administration in
Court, WASH. POST, May 13, 2004, at A22.
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legal justification to use torture during the interrogation of suspected terrorists and that U.S. military officers in Iraq modeled
their interrogation procedures after tactics used at
Guantanamo.23 Fourth, the Court had little reason to fear a
backlash from Congress. The prison scandal and torture memo
came at a political cost to the White House, weakening the administration's in Congress and with the American people.24
Fifth, there was little risk of executive non-acquiescence. In
ruling against the administration, the Court did not compel an
overhaul of administration policies. While signaling that the
Court would play some role in checking the executive and that
the government must give enemy combatants an opportunity to
challenge their detention, the decisions did not place hard limits on the executive.25
Congress had next to nothing to say about the Court's rulings. In the days following the Guantanamo habeas decisions,
no lawmaker spoke on the House or Senate floor about theresults and only a handful issued press releases about the cases.26 In part, lawmaker silence reflects the modern Congress's
practice of treating Supreme Court decisions as final and definitive (a topic I will return to in a few pages).27 More than
that, Abu Ghraib, the torture memo, and the President's
slumping job-approval ratings made congressional discussion of
. the Court beside the point. Lawmakers instead focused their
energies on an intramural squabble over the President's han23. See Neil A. Lewis & Eric Schmitt, Lawyers Decided Bans on Torture
Didn't Bind Bush, N.Y. TIMES, June.8, 2004, at Al; Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey
Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture, WASH. POST, June 8,
2004, at Al.
24. See Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Starts Out on a Five- Week Run Concerning Iraq, Much of It Apparently Uphill, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2004, at Al4.
25. For this reason, pro-executive lawyers were able to characterize the
trio of rulings as a "significant reaffirmation of the President's constitutional
authority as commander in chief in time of war." David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A.
Casey, Bush's Good Day in Court, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2004, at A19. For a
discussion of how the Bush administration attempted to use these decisions to
its advantage, see LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL
POWER 220-52 (2005).
26. See Guantanamo Press Release, Congresswoman Jane Harman, Harman Welcomes Decision by Supreme Court to Provide Detainees with Access
to Courts and Counsel (June 28, 2004), available at http://www.house.gov/
harman/press/releases/2004/062804PR_SupremeCourt.html; Press Release,
Senator Orrin Hatch, Hatch on Guantanamo Bay Supreme Court Decision
(June 28, 2004), available at http://hatch.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=
PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=1090.
27. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
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dling of the war on terror. Democrats pushed for greater oversight while Republicans sought to minimize the political damage of these scandals.
For its part, the Bush administration tried to make lemonade from the lemon the Supreme Court handed it. The Justice
Department press release did not mention that the Court rejected the administration's arguments.2s Instead, the Department emphasized that the Court's decision validated the President's power to detain enemy combatants and that the Court
tempered its demand that enemy combatants be afforded procedural protections by recognizing that these protections "must
reflect the unique context of the detention ... and the need of
the executive to prosecute the war."29 Two weeks later, the administration put some of its new policies into place. Most significant, in anticipation of using military commissions to try
enemy combatants, it created Combatant Status Review Tribunals to determine whether detainees were lawful soldiers or
unlawful enemy combatants.30 The administration also sought
to limit judicial review of its decisions through favorable interpretations of the Geneva Convention and other treaties.31
It did not take long for things to change. Within six months
of the Court's decisions, the District Court of the District of Columbia rejected the Bush administration's decision to use military commissions that operated outside the court martial procedures contemplated by the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.32 That decision was overturned by the D.C. Circuit in
July 2005.33 When the Supreme Court agreed to review this decision on November 7, 2005,34 Congress got into the act.
Just three days after the Court granted certiorari, Congress appeared ready to go for the Court's jugular. On Novem-

28. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Statement of Mark Corallo; Dir. of
Pub. Affairs, Regarding the Enemy Combatant Cases (June 28, 2004), avail·
able at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/June/04_opa_455.htm.
29. !d.
30. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to the Sec'y
of the Navy (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf.
31. SeeR. Jeffrey Smith, Slim Legal Grounds for Torture Memos, WASH.
POST, July 4, 2004, at A12.
32. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 168--70 (D.D.C. 2004),
rev'd, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
33. Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 44.
34. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 622-23.
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ber 10, the Senate approved, by a 49:42 vote,35legislation denying jurisdiction to any "court, justice, or judge" to consider a
habeas petition brought by a Guantanamo detainee.36 The legislation, moreover,·applied both prospectively and retroactively
to any case "pending on or after the· date of the enactment of
this Act."37 And while the amendment allowed the D.C. Circuit
to review whether the Combatant Status Review Tribunal followed its own procedures, there is no doubt that this amendment was both a rebuke of the Court's Rasul decision and a
clear attempt to short-circuit the Hamdan litigation. Most notably, bill sponsor Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) took direct
aim at Rasul, arguing that enemy combatants should not have
meaningful access to civilian courts.ss
Three days later, however, the Graham amendment was
modified in a deal brokered by a bipartisan group of Senators.39
The new version of the bill changed the effective date provision
(eliminating any explicit reference to "pending'' cases), granted
automatic appeals to any detainee sentenced by a military
commission to death or at least ten years of prison, and formally linked the bill to efforts by Senator John McCain (RAriz.) to ban torture and abuse of terrorism suspects held in
U.S. facilities. 40 This bill, enacted as the Detainee Treatment
Act (DTA), was approved by a vote of 84:14.4 1
Two weeks after the President signed the bill, the Justice
Department asked the Supreme Court to dismiss Hamdan. 4 2
35. 151 CONG. REC. S12,667-68 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005).
36. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-163, § 1405, 119 Stat. 3136, 3477.
37. § 1405, 119 Stat. at 3479.
38. See Eric Schmitt, Senate Approves Limiting Rights of U.S. Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at A1; Press Release, Senator Lindsey Graham,
Senate Passes Graham Detainee Plan (Nov. 10, 2005), available at http://
lgraham.senate. gov/index.cfm ?mode=presspage&id=248690.
39. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006,
119 Stat. 2739, 2739-44.
40. See Jonathan Weisman, Senators Agree on Detainee Rights, WASH.
POST, Nov. 15, 2005, at Al.
41. 151 CONG. REC. S12,803 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2005).
42. Respondents' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184). The Justice Department motion
adhered to comments made by President Bush. When signing the DTA, the
President claimed that the bill applied retroactively and that "the executive
branch shall construe [the DTA] to preclude the Federal courts from exercising
subject matter jurisdiction over any existing or future action, including applications for writs of habeas corpus." Press Release, President George W. Bush,
President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the "Department of Defense,
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Pointing to statutory language that "no court, justice, or judge
shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider" any action filed by a
Guantanamo detainee, the government argued that the DTA
"clearly evinces Congress's intent" both to respond to Rasul and
to "strictly ... limit the judicial review available to aliens detained at Guantanamo."43
The Supreme Court was not fazed by the DTA or the government's motion to dismiss. It deferred consideration of the issue until it heard oral arguments in Hamdan.44 And when the
Court decided Hamdan in June 2006, the Court ruled five to
three that the DTA did not apply retroactively to Hamdan's habeas petition. 45 The Court then turned to the merits, ruling
that the Bush administration needed explicit congressional authorization before it could constitute military commissions. 46
The Court also concluded that, until Congress said otherwise,
the Geneva Conventions apply to Guantanamo detainees and
the Conventions are enforceable in federal court.47
Over the next three months, Congress and the Bush administration crafted a legislative response to Hamdan. Approved by Congress in September 2006, the Military Commissions Act (MCA) both authorizes military commission trials of
enemy combatants and prohibits federal court consideration of
habeas petitions filed by detainees. 48 Also, while placing limits
on CIA interrogation techniques and declaring the United
States obligated to abide by existing treaty obligations, the
MCA gives the administration substantial leeway to sort out
how to apply the Geneva Conventions and other treaties. 49
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of
Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006" (Dec. 30, 2005), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html.
43. Respondents' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, supra note
42, at 8-9, 20.
44. See United States Supreme Court, Docket for 05-184, http://www
.supremecourtus.gov/docket/05-184.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
45. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2764-69.
46. Id. at 2774-81.
47. Id. at 2793-96.
48. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600. Under the MCA, moreover, enemy combatant status extends both to
Guantanamo detainees (who had been found to be "unlawful enemy combat·
ants") and to anyone who has "purposefully and materially" supported hostil·
ity against the United States (including people who provided support off the
battlefield). Id. § 948a, 120 Stat. at 2601.
49. See Scott Shane & Adam Liptak, Shifting Power to a President, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at Al.
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B. ANALYSIS
Against this backdrop, how can I argue that Congress did
not see its jurisdiction stripping statutes as rebukes to the
Court? Mter all, Congress enacted the DTA only weeks after
the Court granted certiorari in Hamdan, and the MCA followed
in the immediate wake of the Court's decision. Congress, in
other words, made clear that it wanted to circumscribe judicial
review of claims by enemy combatants-both in anticipation of
and in response to the Court's Hamdan decision. At the same
time, for reasons I will now detail, Congress never saw its
handiwork as challenging the Court's power to sort out the legality of presidentially created military commissions, the applicability of the Geneva Convention to Guantanamo detainees,
and the availability of habeas corpus relief to enemy combatants. For this very reason, Congress did not question Hamdan's
rulings on military commissions and the Geneva Convention.5o
Likewise, Congress would be quite accepting of a Court decision
invalidating MCA provisions prohibiting federal court consideration of habeas corpus filings by Guantanamo detainees.
To start, Congress did not intend the DTA to short-circuit
Supreme Court review in Hamdan. Even though congressional
debates began three days after the grant of certiorari, the bill
had been filed before the Court's decision to hear the case.51
Even more, Congress ultimately deleted language in the original bill precluding federal court review of pending cases. 52 And
while lawmakers did not explicitly embrace Supreme Court review of pending challenges (like Hamdan's), no supporter of the
bill challenged bill cosponsor Carl Levin's (D-Mich.) claim that
the bill "would apply only to new habeas cases filed after the
date of enactment."53 Some opponents of the bill argued that
their opposition to the measure was tied to their belief that the
bill would apply retroactively and, consequently, prevent the
Supreme Court from assessing the legality of military tribunals
50. Some lawmakers, of course, were deeply disappointed by Hamdan .
But these lawmakers-even those who might have resented what the Court
did--did not challenge the Court. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying
text.
51. See 151 CONG. REC. S14,263-U4 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of
Sen. Kyl) (noting that the amendment was introduced before the grant of certiorari and, consequently, that it is "hard to argue that the amendment was
motivated by a desire to strip the court of its jurisdiction in [Hamdan]") .
52. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
53. 151 CONG. REC. S12,802 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Levin); id. at S12, 754-55 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005).
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in Hamdan.54 Indeed, the fact that eighty-four Senators voted
for the amended bill provides strong evidence that the Senate
did not intend to foreclose Supreme Court review in Hamdan.
None of this is to say that Congress formally embraced Supreme Court consideration of niill.tary tribunals in Hamdan.
The statutory language is silent on that question.55 Furthermore, even though the bill's other cosponsors (Lindsey Graham
and John Kyl (R-Ariz.)) never responded to Senator Levin,56
they both made clear that they wanted their bill to block the
Hamdan litigation. Minutes before the Senate gave final approval to the bill, they inserted into the Congressional Record a
colloquy stating their belief that the bill should apply retroactively.57 Graham and Kyl also filed an amicus brief in Hamdan,
arguing that the DTA should be applied retroactively.58 Nevertheless, the insertion of a conversation that never took place
into the Congressional Record seems an end run-hardly the
stuff to convince a Supreme Court Justice (or anyone) that
Congress intended to snuff out Supreme Court review in Hamdan. 59 Put another way: whether or not the Congress wanted
54. See Brief of Senators Graham and Kyl as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 17, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184)
[hereinafter Kyl and Graham Amicus Brief] (listing Senators who commented
that the amendment would strip the Court of jurisdiction).
55. The majority and dissenting opinions in Hamdan endorsed competing,
diametrically opposed approaches to the statutory interpretation questionthe majority concluding that jurisdiction should be preserved unless Congress
says otherwise, the dissent arguing that the plain language of the statute eliminated jurisdiction. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2769 n.15, 2810; see also infra
notes 137-38 and accompanying text (elaborating upon the difference in approaches).
56. This lack of response is particularly noteworthy because Graham
spoke immediately after Levin on two of the three occasions in which Levin
contended that the Act was prospective in application. See 151 CONG. REC.
S12,802 (Nov. 15, 2005); 151 CONG. REC. S12,754-56 (Nov. 14, 2005); 151
CONG. REC. S12,664 (Nov. 10, 2005).
57. 151 CONG. REC. S14,260-68 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005).
58. See Kyl and Graham Amicus Brief, supra note 54, at 9-22; Dan Eggen, Record Shows Senators' 'Debate' That Wasn't, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2006,
at A6 (noting that the colloquy never took place, notwithstanding efforts by
Graham and Kyl to contend in their amicus brief that comments in the Congressional Record are "presumed to reflect live debate except when the statements therein are followed by a bullet ... or are underlined").
59. In suggesting that a Justice might discount the Graham-Kyl colloquy,
I am not arguing that the Court should look to lawmaker comments when
sorting out the meaning of statutory language. My point, instead, is that the
failure of Senators Graham and Kyl to rebut Senator Levin (the third cosponsor of the amendment-and the cosponsor who pushed for the deletion of the
language establishing retroactivity) suggests that those lawmakers who fa-
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the Supreme Court to decide the fate of military tribunals in
Hamdan, it is almost certain that Congress understood that the
Court might ultimately make that decision.
Beyond removing language governing the retroactive application of the bill, Congress modified the DTA in ways that
make clear that it did not see the bill as a rebuke to the courts.
For example, by providing for D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court
review of military commission sentences exceeding ten years,6o
lawmakers intended to preserve independent judicial review of
significant military commission verdicts. Correspondingly,
lawmakers depicted the bill as both recognizing the need for
"federal court oversight" of military operations and advancing
military effectiveness by allowing the military to prosecute the
war on terror without being unduly burdened by frivolous lawsuits.61 Senator Graham echoed these remarks, noting. that the
DTA prevented "lawsuit abuse" by prohibiting habeas filings6 2
while, at the same time, conceding that the original bill was
"flawed" because it did not allow for court review of military
commission appeals.63
In other significant ways, lawmakers made clear that they
did not see the DTA as an attack on either the Court or an independent judiciary. Lawmakers depicted themselves as workvored retroactive application of the statute did not feel that they could successfully fight this fight on the Senate floor. For a Justice interested in sorting out
whether the Court's assertion of jurisdiction in Hamdan might provoke a congressional backlash, the failure of Senators Graham and Kyl to fight this fight
is telling.
60. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119
Stat. 2680, 2742 ("[T]he U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any final decision of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal that an alien is properly detained as an enemy
combatant."). The statute did not explicitly mention Supreme Court review of
the D.C. Circuit judgments. However, the sponsors of the Act, Lindsey Graham and John Kyl, made it clear that they anticipated judicial review. See 151
CONG. REC. S14,268 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl); id. at
S12,801 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham) . Senator Arlen
Specter (R-P.A.) provided a competing perspective. See id. at S12,801 (statement of Sen. Specter) ("[The amendment] means what it says-the Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction.").
61. See 151 CONG. REC. S12,754-55 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of
Sen. Levin).
62. ld. at S12, 755 (statement of Sen. Graham).
63. Id. at S12,754. Even Senator Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.), who voted
against the bill, recognized that, after Rasul, "the present level of accessibility
to our courts by individuals who would do us harm is unprecedented in our
nation's history." Id. at S14,271 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Clinton).
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ing collegially with the Court; several Senators, for example,
contended that the "Supreme Court has been shouting to us in
Congress: Get involved," and thereby depicted Rasul as a "challenge" to Congress, 64 "asking the Senate and the House, do you
intend for ... enemy' combatants ... to challenge their detention [in federal courts] as if they were American citizens?"65
Lawmakers also spoke of detainee habeas petitions as an
"abuse" 66 of the federal courts, and warned that such petitions
might unduly clog the courts, 67 thus "swamping the system"68
with "frivolous" complaints.69 Under this view, the DTA's cabining of federal court jurisdiction "respects" the Court's independence and its role in the detainee process. 70
Not all lawmakers saw the DTA as a model of CourtCongress cooperation. Opponents of the bill depicted the measure as undermining the rule of law and unduly limiting the
courts' jurisdiction.71 With that said, it is telling that supporters of the measure both embraced judicial independence and
claimed to follow the Court's instructions in Rasul. Correspondingly, by removing the retroactivity provision from the DTA,
lawmakers signaled to the Supreme Court that it could (without risking a legislative backlash) use Hamdan to invalidate
the Bush administration's military commission initiative.
Congress's response to Hamdan backs up these claims,
notwithstanding the fact that the MCA eliminates the federal
64. I d. at S12, 753 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
65. Id. at S12,732; see also id. at S12,659 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Specter) ("The Supreme Court finally took the bull by the horns
... because the Congress had not acted."); id. (statement of Sen. Kyl) (noting
that Rasul was a statutory ruling and, consequently, that Congress could clarify its intent without contradicting the Court). Senators similarly characterized Justice O'Connor's Hamdi opinion as an invitation for Congress to narrow
detainee rights legislatively. See id. at S12,656 (statement of Sen. Graham).
66. See id. at S14,262 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
67. See id. at S12,659 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
68. See id. at S12,732 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
69. See id. at S14,262 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham) (arguing that his amendment was designed to prevent detainees from
abusing the federal courts by flooding them with frivolous lawsuits).
70. See id. at S14,263 (statement of Sen. Graham) ("[W]e wanted to respect the courts' role ....").
71. See id. at S14,271 (statement of Sen. Clinton); id. at S12,803 (daily ed.
Nov. 15, 2005) (statement of Sen. Reid) ("[H]abeas corpus protects all of us-it
is the way we ensure that the Executive Branch acts within the bounds of the
law.").
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courts' jurisdiction over enemy combatants' habeas corpus petitions. To start, lawmakers did not challenge the Court's ruling
in Hamdan. Republicans who were instrumental in passing the
DTA depicted Hamdan as a rallying call for Congress "to do our
job, to clarify the law." 72 Representative Duncan Hunter (RCal.), who introduced the legislation on the House floor, said
during the debates that the bill was a response to the "mandate
of the Supreme Court that Congress involve itself in producing
this new structure to prosecute terrorists."73 And DTA sponsor
Lindsey Graham stated: "The Supreme Court has set the rules
of the road and the Congress and the president can drive to the
destination together."7 4 Even lawmakers who expressed disappointment in the Court's ruling did not criticize the Court.
Senator John Cornyn (R-Tex.), for example, blamed Hamdan's
lawyers for misleading the Court about the legislative history
of the DTA. 75
Needless to say, Democratic opponents of the DTA celebrated Hamdan as a "triumph for the rule of law" 76 and our
system of "checks and balances," where Congress has a vital
role in defining detainee rights. 77 For his part, President Bush
promised to "protect the people and, at the same time, conform
with the findings of the Supreme Court."78 White House Press
Secretary Tony Snow echoed the President's comments at a
press briefing. Snow remarked that the President will "figure
72. Press Release, Senator Jim lnhofe, Inhofe Statement on Terrorist·
Detainee Treatment Bill, CONG. Q. (Sept. 15, 2006).
73. 152 CONG. REC. H7535 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Hunter).
74. David E. Sanger & Scott Shane, Court's Ruling Is Likely to Force Negotiations over Presidential Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at A21; see also
Congressional Hearings on Guantanamo Set, USA TODAY, June 30, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-06-30-gitmo-hearings_x.htm
(quoting Senator John McCain as saying, "I'm confident that we can come up
with a framework that guarantees we comply with the Court's order").
75. See 152 CONG. REC. 810,404 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of
Sen. Cornyn).
76. Rep. Pelosi Responds to Supreme Court Decision on Guantcinamo Military Commissions, U.S. FED. NEWS, June 29, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
11334427.
77. Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Reaction to Supreme Court's
Decision in Hamdan Case (June 29, 2006), http://leahy.senate.gov/press/
200606/062906.html; Press Release, Senator Carl Levin, Statement on the Supreme Court's Decision in the Case of Hamdan v. United States, CONG. Q.
(June 29, 2006).
78. The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1242, 1244 (June 29, 2006).
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out precisely what the Court is saying here, and how to proceed
in a way that comports with it."79 Furthermore, Snow stated
that it is "now the obligation of the administration ... to execute laws that are consistent with the Supreme Court's holding."so
When crafting the MCA, lawmakers uniformly agreed that
"whatever the Congress does, the legislation [it] produce[s]
must be able to withstand further security review and scrutiny
of the federal court system, particularly the Supreme Court."8 1
For Representative Susan Davis (D-Cal.), fidelity to the Court's
understanding of the Constitution was especially important because the Court in Hamdan "entrusted this Congress with the
duty to reform military tribunals in a manner consistent with
the Constitution and international treaty obligations."S2 At the
same time, most lawmakers treated Hamdan as simply a call
for Congress to set policy in this area-to formally authorize
military commissions and to place constraints on the operation
of those commissions. Under this view, lawmakers went about
balancing the Geneva Conventions, habeas corpus filings, judicial review, and executive branch discretion. Their solution was
a bill that authorized military commissions, limited interrogation techniques, embraced the Geneva Conventions (while giving the executive branch discretion in interpreting the Conventions), allowed judicial review of Combatant Status Review
Tribunal determinations that an individual was an enemy
combatant, permitted judicial review of commission judgments,
and prohibited federal court consideration of habeas filings by
enemy combatants. 83

79. Press Briefing by Tony Snow, White House Press Sec'y (June 29,
2006), http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060629-6.html.
80. See id. Two weeks after the Court's decision, the President extended
basic Geneva Convention protections to Guantanamo detainees. See Scott
Shane, Terror and Presidential Power: Bush Takes a Step Back, N.Y. TIMES,
July 12, 2006, at A20. The administration later retreated from this position.
See Kate Zernike, Administration Prods Congress to Curb the Rights of Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2006, at A1 (discussing the Bush administration's changed position, especially its decision to urge Congress to "narrowly
define the rights granted to detainees" under Common Article Three of the
Geneva Conventions).
81. 152 CONG. REC. S10,245-46 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of
Sen. Warner).
82. 152 CONG. REC. H7944 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Davis).
83. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 948b, 948r,
120 Stat. 2600, 2602, 2607, 2637. For discussion of the compromise reached on
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In eliminating habeas filings,B 4 Congress did not intend to
pick a knock-down fight with the courts. Just as the DTA recognized an important judicial role while eliminating habeas filings,B5 the MCA likewise was premised on the view that habeas
filings both clogged the courts and "hampered the war effort."B6
Debates over the MCA habeas provision, moreover, reveal that
lawmakers thought that the Supreme Court was responsible
for ultimately determining the meaning of habeas protections.B7
Specifically, lawmakers argued that they were operating within

the bill, see Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Senate Approves De·
tainee Bill Backed by Bush, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2006, at Al. See also John
W. Warner et al., Look Past the Tortured Distortions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2,
2006, at AlO (explaining the key provisions of the MCA as understood by the
bill's architects). For news stories detailing political battles between the White
House and Senate Republicans as well as squabbles between Democrats and
Republicans in Congress, see Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, G.O.P
Upbeat on Terror- Trial Bill: House Leaders Satisfied with Bush-Senate Compromise, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2006, at A6; Carl Hulse et al., How 3 G.O.P.
Veterans Stalled Bush Detainee Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2006, sec. 1, at 1;
Jonathan Weisman & Peter Baker, White House Offers New Proposal on Interrogations, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2006, at A4; Kate Zernike, Lawyers and
G.O.P. Chiefs Resist Tribunal Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2006, at Al.
84. Unlike the DTA (which limited federal court review of sentences exceeding ten years), the MCA authorizes federal court review of all sentences.
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948d, 120 Stat.
2600, 2603. Nonetheless, enemy combatants are not entitled to a trial de novo
and, consequently, federal appellate courts must rely on a record which may
include hearsay evidence as well as evidence obtained through aggressive interrogation techniques. See id. § 949a, 120 Stat. at 2608; Julian E. Barnes &
Richard B. Schmitt, Tribunal Bill Sets Up an Ironic Legal Limbo, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2006, at A14. The law, moreover, does not address whether limits on
the executive's power to hold enemy combatants are necessary. In this way,
the law places no limits on the power of government to hold enemy combatants
indefinitely. See 152 CONG. REC. S10,262 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (letter from
John Hutson et al. to Senator Warner and Senator Levin) (noting that highranking al Qaeda members may enjoy more procedural protections through
military commission trials than low-level suspects who have never been
charged). In its 2004 rulings and again in Hamdan, the Supreme Court likewise placed no limits on the government's power to hold enemy combatants.
See Rivkin & Casey, supra note 25 (noting that Hamdi and Padilla "mark a
significant reaffirmation of the President's constitutional authority as commander in chief in a time of war").
85. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
86. Neil A. Lewis & Kate Zerinke, Measures Seek to Restrict Detainees'
Access to Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, at A22 (quoting Senator Lindsey
Graham).
87. For an insightful accounting of the MCA habeas provision focusing on
Republican Party politics, see Jeffrey Toobin, Killing Habeas Corpus, NEW
YORKER, Dec. 4, 2006, at 46.
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parameters set by the Court and, if not, that the Court could
eviscerate the MCA's habeas provision.
Fifty-one Senators voted against a proposed amendment to
provide habeas protections to Guantanamo detainees. 88 These
lawmakers (50 Republicans and 1 Democrat) argued that the
Constitution did not afford habeas protections to enemy combatants.89 In other words, enemy combatants were only entitled
to habeas protections afforded to them by Congress-statutory
rights that Congress could modify as it saw fit.90 Lawmakers
backed up this claim by citing Supreme Court decisions.9 1 No
supporter of the statute argued that Congress was challenging
the Court by stripping the Court's jurisdiction to hear constitutionally guaranteed habeas claims. Congress simply followed
Hamdan's directive by stating its policy preferences. Specifically, if the Supreme Court were to conclude, in a challenge to
the MCA, that enemy combatants possessed constitutional habeas rights, the Court could neuter that statutory provision
without invalidating the statute on constitutional grounds. For
instance, the Court could conclude that Congress sought only to
nullify statutory habeas rights-so that the MCA did not seek
to strip the Court of jurisdiction to hear constitutionally guaranteed habeas claims. 92
Forty-eight Senators (43 Democrats, 4 Republicans, and 1
Independent) supported the habeas amendment.93 These Sena88. 152 CONG. REC. S10,369 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006).
89. The Senate debate took place on September 27 and 28, 2006. See id. at
S10,354-69 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006); id. at S10,263-74 (daily ed. Sept. 27,
2006).
90. One of the principal architects of the MCA, Senator Graham, stated:
"It is a statutory right of habeas that has been granted to enemy combatants.
And if there is a constitutional right of habeas corpus given to enemy combatants, that is a totally different endeavor, and it would change in many ways
what I have said." 151 CONG. REC. S10,267 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Graham).
91. See id. at S10,268 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(proposing that aliens held at home or abroad do not have authority to invoke
the Constitution (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
(1990); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950))).
92. Statements made by Senator Graham and others make clear that
lawmakers intended to eliminate only statutory habeas corpus rights. See 152
CONG. REC. S10,267 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Graham); id.
at S10,265 (statement of Sen. Warner) (arguing that Supreme Court precedents establish statutory, not constitutional, habeas rights for enemy combatants); id. at S10,267 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (refuting the argument that enemy combatants maintain a "constitutional right to habeas").
93. 152 CONG. REC. S10,369 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006).
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tors argued that enemy combatants possessed constitutional
habeas rights, that Congress could not constitutionally strip
the courts of jurisdiction, and that the courts would strike down
the language limiting the courts' jurisdiction.s4 Lawmakers also
spoke about the need for Congress and the courts to check executive branch excess, including a military commission system
that puts the President in charge of enemy combatant trials.
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), for example, said that the habeas provision "will remove the checks in our legal system that
provide against arbitrarily detaining people for life without
charge."9 5 These lawmakers hope and expect that the Court
will invalidate the MCA language prohibiting judicial consideration of habeas claims.
In summary, legislation that strips the courts of habeas jurisdiction in enemy combatant cases is anything but a rebuke
to the Court's rulings in Rasul and Hamdan. Lawmakers did
not criticize the Court for these rulings. Rather, when enacting
the MCA, lawmakers claimed that they were following Court
interpretations of the Constitution by codifying the provisions
of the Hamdan decision while respecting the Court's habeas
corpus jurisprudence. Lawmakers likewise recognized that the
Court would pass judgment on their handiwork and that they
would support a Court ruling that nullified the habeas corpus
provision of the MCA,96 just as they backed the Court's interpretation of the DTA in Hamdan.97 Finally, when enacting the
DTA, lawmakers signaled the Supreme Court that they would
94. 151 CONG. REC. S10,356--57 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of
Sen. Leahy) (describing the provision as inconsistent with two hundred years
of jurisprudence and "a betrayal of the most basic values of freedom for which
America stands"); id. at S10,366 (statement of Sen. Levin) (noting that the
courts will strike down court-stripping legislation and arguing that Congress
therefore must fulfill its responsibility to protect "that great writ of habeas
corpus which is in the Constitution"); id. at S10,367 (statement of Sen. Specter) ("[T]he Constitution is explicit in the statement that habeas corpus may
be suspended only with rebellion or invasion .... We do not have a rebellion
or invasion.").
95. 152 CONG. REC. S10,357 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Leahy). Senator Leahy also asked for unanimous consent to have printed in
the Record a letter from more than sixty law school deans and professors who
"state that the Congress would gravely disserve our global reputation by [abolishing habeas corpus]." ld. (letter from law school deans and professors to U.S.
Senators and members of Congress) ("[T]he [MCA] ignores the importance of
shared institutional powers and checks and balances in crafting lawful and
sustainable responses to the war on terror.").
96. See supra notes 82-95.
97. See supra notes 72-80.
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support a Court ruling invalidating the President's military
commission initiative.

***
Legislative consideration of the DTA and the MCA reveal
that Congress accepts the Court's power to define the Constitution's meaning and invalidate or limit federal statutes. The fact
that these bills restrict federal court jurisdiction over
Guantanamo detainee filings reflects Congress's policy preferences, not Congress's attitudes about the Supreme Court. Specifically, lawmakers look to the courts to settle constitutional
questions. Indeed, the legislative debates surrounding jurisdiction-limiting bills-like the DTA and the MCA-acquiesce to
the courts' power to say what the law is.98
Unlike the Warren Court era, when legislative proposals
reflected intense lawmaker disapproval of Supreme Court decisions, today's Congress is not interested in challenging the
Court.99 For example, Congress acquiesced to a spate of
Rehnquist Court rulings that invalidated all or part of thirtyone federal statutes.10o Congress did not care that the Court
both depicted itself as the supreme expositor of the Constitution and invalidated more federal statutes than any of its predecessor Courts. Likewise, lawmakers did not object to the
Court's reinvigoration of federalism constraints on Congress,lOl
Rather, lawmakers treated the Court's rulings as final and authoritative. Lawmakers did not hold hearings on the rulings,
they entered virtually no comments about the rulings in the
Congressional Record, and their legislative responses to the
Court's decisions never questioned the Court but, instead,
sought to conform to the Court's rulings.102

98. Lawmakers have not always looked to the courts to settle constitutional issues. See generally NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2004); Devins, supra note 2, at 1342-46, 1349-55 (comparing
the Warren Court to today's Congress).
99. See Devins, supra note 2, at 1352.
100. See supra note 16 (citing articles arguing that the Rehnquist Court
embraced the rhetoric of judicial supremacy); infra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
101. See generally Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers
Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 435-37
(2001).
102. See Neal Devins, The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 72-74 (2004).
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Perhaps more striking, recent proposals to strip the courts
of jurisdiction over same-sex marriage, the pledge of allegiance,
and other social issues were rhetorical moves in which Republican lawmakers sought to .strengthen ties with their socialconservative baseJ03 Congress had nciinterest in passing those
measures. In the 2003-04 Congress, legislators voted on only
two of those measures-same sex marriage and the pledge of
allegiance-and they cast those votes in the House shortly before the November elections, making it impossible for the Senate to consider the bills before the end of the legislative session.l04 In the 2005-06 session, the House voted on only one
such measure, addressing the pledge of allegianceJ05
When lawmakers did advocate jurisdiction-stripping proposals on social issues, they often made fiery speeches about
"activist" judges and the need for Congress to assert its supremacy on such issuesJ06 In stark contrast, legislative consideration of a jurisdiction-limiting proposal on enemy combatants
was extremely deferential to the courts and the supremacy of
Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes and the Constitution. This mismatch between rhetoric and reality suggests
that Congress has little desire to pressure the Court into adhering to Congress's preferred vision of constitutional truth. Rhetorical attacks on the Court are addressed to social conservatives, not the Court. When Congress does address the Court,
such as through legislation restricting the court's jurisdiction,
Congress leaves it to the Court to sort out whether to give effect
to the legislation.

103. Devins, supra note 2, at 1355-57.
104. See Neal Devins, Smoke, Not Fire, 65 MD. L. REV. 197, 202-04 (2006).
105. See 152 CONG. REC. H5396 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (reporting the
votes cast on the Pledge Protection Act of 2005). The Pledge Protection Act of
2005 was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee in August of 2006. 152
CONG. REC. S8795 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2006). The Senate did not take action before the end of the legislative session on October 2, 2006. Senators introduced
several other bills that sought to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction in the
2005-06 Congress, including legislation on same-sex marriage, the sanctity of
life, and the Ten Commandments. See Devins, supra note 2, at 1356-57. Aside
from a judicial review provision in a massive bill dealing with the legal rights
of undocumented immigrants, however, none of these jurisdiction-altering bills
was discussed in congressional hearings or on the floor of either the Senate or
the House. See Memorandum from Svetlana Khvalina to Neal Devins, CourtStripping Bills in the 109th Congress (Sept. 17, 2006) (on file with the author).
106. See Devins, supra note 104, at 201-02; Sam Rosenfeld, Disorder in the
Court, AM. PROSPECT, July 3, 2005, at 24, 26.
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II. A POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY READING OF

HAMDANV RUMSFELD
In agreeing to review Hamdan-after the D.C. Circuit had
backed the Bush administration-the Supreme Court signaled
its willingness to check the President's prosecution of the war
on terror.l07 When deciding Hamdan in light of the DTA language restricting court jurisdiction, the Court had to sort out
whether it wanted to do battle with Congress and the executive. The Court, for example, could have passed judgment on
the constitutionality of DTA restrictions on court jurisdiction.
Instead, the Court depicted the DTA as a delegation of power
from Congress to the Supreme Court-so that the Court acted
at Congress's behest when determining the legality of military
commissions and the relevance of the Geneva Conventions to
enemy combatant trials.
The remainder of this Essay explains why the Justices decided both to frame the DTA as they did and to repudiate the
Bush administration's claims about military commissions. This
explanation focuses on institutional incentives; specifically, the
Court's desire to protect its turf and maximize its influence
over the other branches. I will not assess relevant Supreme
Court precedent to determine whether the Court's interpretation of the DTA, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and
other statutes was sound. 108 Likewise, I will not assess whether
the Bush administration's legal interpretations regarding military commissions served the national interest.109 Rather, this
Part provides a positive political account of the Hamdan opinion, assuming that Supreme Court Justices have "institutional
preferences that may enhance or weaken the strength of [their]

107. The Court's grant of certiorari in Rasullikewise spoke to the Court's
willingness to defend its turf by checking the President's power. See Linda
Greenhouse, It's a Question of Federal Turf, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2003, at Al.
108. The fact that the Court divided five to three on these issues suggests
that there were two plausible interpretations of the relevant statutes and related constitutional provisions. Indeed, the Court would have likely divided
five to four if Chief Justice Roberts had not recused himself from the case. After all, Roberts ruled for the administration on these issues when sitting on
the D.C. Circuit. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
109. Compare JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT
OF THE WAR ON TERROR passim (2006) (defending the Bush administration's
stance on military commissions), with Louis Fisher, Lost Constitutional Moorings: Recovering the War Power, 81 IND. L. J . 1199, 1234-44 (2006) (attacking
executive supremacy in war making and the scholarly writings of John Yoo).
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ideological preferences" 11 0 and that "[t]he pivotal Justices have
repeatedly submerged their immediate substantive preferences
to serve long-term procedural values."11 1
Throughout its prosecu.tion of the war on terror, the Bush
administration has sought to limit, if not nullify, judicial checks
on the executive. For Justices interested in preserving their
own authority, these arguments were too much. "It seems
rather contrary to ail idea of a Constitution with three
branches," as Justice Breyer put it, "that the executive would
be free to do whatever they want ... without a check."112 Similarly, with respect to the administration's ability to win in
court, the swing Justices on the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts-Sandra Day O'Conpor and Anthony Kennedy, respectively-worried openly about the executive's ''blank check" view
of presidential war-making power. 11 3
Let me make this point more concretely, starting with
Bush administration claims about executive branch supremacy
in war making. The administration was not interested in narrow, technical victories. It sought to fence the courts out and it
was very assertive in its rhetoric. In Rasul, the government did
not simply argue that the Court was without jurisdiction to
rule on the legal rights of detainees captured abroad and held
in Guantanamo Bay (a military base that the United States
leased from Cuba).1 14 It claimed that "[t]he Constitution commits to the political branches and, in particular, the president,
the responsibility for conducting the Nation's foreign affairs
and military operations."l15 The government, moreover, warned
the Court that "exercising jurisdiction" over Guantanamo detainees would "strike a serious blow" to the war effort by placing the judiciary in the "unprecedented position of micro110. Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive
Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 783
(1996).
111. Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's 'Vnsteady Path':· A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1447, 1491 (1995).
112. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)
(Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
113. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799-805 (2006) (Kennedy,
J ., concurring in part); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 509, 535-36 (2004)
(O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) .
114. The brief did make narrow claims about past precedent governing the
rights of enemy combatants captured and held abroad. See Brief for the Respondents at 13, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
115. ld. at 12.
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managing the Executive's handling of captured enemy combatants."116
The government's arguments in Hamdan were cut from
the same cloth. It asked the Court to moot the case, arguing
that the DTA applied retroactively and thereby stripped the
Court of jurisdiction.117 On the merits, the government argued
that the President had inherent authority to establish military
tribunals and that the decision of whether the Geneva Conventions apply to enemy combatants is "solely for the executive."llS
At a minimum, "[e]ven if some judicial review of the President's
determination were appropriate . . . the standard of review
would surely be extraordinarily deferential to the President."n9
Needless to say, the government's absolutism would be an
anathema to a Court interested in protecting its turf. For a
Court interested in asserting its supremacy on constitutional
questions, the government's claim would be-if you will-a call
to arms. The Rehnquist Court was certainly such a Court, and
there is good reason to think that the Roberts Court (at least
for now) will follow suit.120 Before turning to the Roberts
Court's repudiation of executive branch unilateralism in Ham-

116. Id. at 12-13. The government also cautioned against judicial micromanagement in a pair of 2004 cases challenging the government's power to
detain American citizens designated as enemy combatants. See Hamdi, 542
U.S. at 514; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 428 (2004). Most striking, as
already noted, is that the government rebuffed questions about military officers torturing enemy combatants by stating there were real world and legal
limits on "the method[s] of interrogation that may be employed" and citing
treaty obligations and the inherent unreliability of information gained through
overly aggressive interrogation techniques. Transcript of Oral Argument at
48-50, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696); see also Stevenson, supra note 24
(noting that the government's claims were misleading and that those claims
contradicted the Justice Department's torture memo and the Abu Ghraib
prison scandal).
117. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
118. Brief for Respondents at 38, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184).
119. Id. The government did not simply rely on these broad claims of
power. It also argued that Congress had authorized military commissions and
that the language of the Geneva Conventions and relevant judicial precedent
suggest that the Conventions do not apply to al Qaeda. Id. at 15-20, 38.
120. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussing the
Rehnquist Court's juricentric view of its role). In saying that the Rehnquist
Court embraced judicial supremacy, I am not arguing that the Court either
operated outside of the political mainstream or was insensitive to social and
political forces. See Devins, supra note 102 (explaining how Rehnquist Court
decisions-even decisions invalidating federal statutes-reflect majoritarian
social and political forces).
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dan, a few words about the Rehnquist Court will illustrate this
point.
The Rehnquist Court left a legacy of judicial supremacy
through words and deeds. It invalidated more federal statutes
than any Court before it12 1 and, in so doing, reinvigorated federalism-based limits on Congress,122 Depicting Bush v. Gore as
an "unsought responsibility," the Court did not blink when resolving the 2000 presidential election,123 In reaffirming abortion rights, it condemned state and federal efforts to pressure
the Court to revisit Roe v. Wade, 12 4 saying that it was the
Court's job to bring "the contending sides of a national controversy [together] to end their national division by accepting a
common mandate rooted in the Constitution."I25 Likewise,
when rejecting federal efforts to override Supreme Court standards governing religious liberty, the Court made clear that it
"will treat its precedents with the respect due them," and that
Congress and the President should also "respect ... the proper
actions and determinations of the [Court]." 1 26 The list goes onthere is near universal agreement about the modern Court's
embrace of the rhetoric of judicial supremacy.l27
That the Court had strong incentives to slap down the executive in Hamdan cannot be denied. Beyond executive branch
unilateralism and the modern Court's view that the resolution
of all constitutional matters lies within its jurisdiction, the specific facts of Hamdan also contributed to the Court's decision.
In particular, the Court is more likely to see the elaboration of

121. See supra notes 16-18.
122. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
123. 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000). For arguments that judicial hubris underlies
the Court's very participation in Bush u. Gore, see David A. Strauss, Bush v.
Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737 passim (2001); John
C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 passim
(2001); Gerald Gunther, Op-Ed., A Risky Moment for the Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2000, at A37.
124. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
125. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992). This
contention was largely rhetorical. The Court retreated in Casey by jettisoning
Roe's trimester framework. See id. at 858.
126. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997); see also Linda
Greenhouse, Steady Rationale at Court Despite Apparent Bend, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 2003, at A22 (noting that the Rehnquist Court embraced judicial supremacy even when upholding congressional efforts to expand rights).
127. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 107; Post & Siegal, supra note 16, at
2037; Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 1969; Yoo, supra note 123, at 787-88.
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individual rights as being at the Court's "core power."128 This
factor is especially important for habeas corpus claims, for-as
the Court proclaimed in 2001-"the writ of habeas corpus has
served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been
strongest."129 Indeed, at oral arguments in Hamdan, Justice
Kennedy emphasized the importance of habeas corpus relief, 130
suggesting that limitations on habeas relief would "threaten[]
the status of the judiciary as a co-equal partner of the legislature and the executive."131
Against this backdrop, the Court's repudiation of military
tribunals in Hamdan was anything but surprising. At the same
time, Hamdan was not simply an individual rights case; it also
presented a basic challenge to a key component of the President's war on terrorJ32 The Court is unlikely to stand alone in
such a case, even if the case does raise fundamental individual
rights issues. The President sees the "rights of governance in
foreign affairs and war powers areas" as core executive powers
and has strong incentives to expand his war-making prerogatives.133 Moreover, the stakes are extremely high and the
Court's capacity to second guess military judgments is questionable.134 Without the backing of Congress, courts typically
turn down challenges to presidential war making. 135 Even with

128. John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign
Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation
of Powers, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 306-08 (1993).
129. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
130. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42-44, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.
Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184).
131. Alison Holland, Note, Across the Border and over the Line: Congress's
Attack on Criminal Aliens and the Judiciary Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 27 AM. J. GRIM. L. 385, 398 (2000). Justice
Kennedy's comments at oral arguments emphasized the need for enemy combatants to be "tried by a lawful tribunal" and suggested that the denial of habeas relief raised a "structural," not "procedural," question. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 43, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184). Accordingly, there is
reason to think that Justice Kennedy will be skeptical of Congress's prohibition of habeas claims in the MCA.
132. See supra notes 7-10, 28-31.
133. McGinnis, supra note 128, at 306; see also William Michael Treanor,
Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695
passim (1997) (outlining the debate surrounding the President's power under
the War Powers Clause).
134. McGinnis, supra note 128, at 306.
135. As then appellate judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg put it: "Congress has
formidable weapons at its disposal .... 'If the Congress chooses not to con-
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the backing of Congress, the Court would not want to assert its
supremacy through a holding on the constitutionality of presidential war powers, which would be difficult to reverse.136
The challenge for the Hamdan Court, therefore, was to
somehow depict the conflict as one between Congress and the
President. The Court did not want to rule that the DTA, in fact,
applied retroactively and that Congress could not strip the
courts of jurisdiction to rule on the legality of presidentially
created military commissions and the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to enemy combatant trials. Likewise, the
Court did not want to rule on the constitutional status of enemy combatants, including the authority of Congress to restrict
habeas rights.
Hamdan did not speak to these questions. Instead, the
Court found a way to partner with Congress while, at the same
time, repudiating broad claims of executive power. First, the
Court ruled that the DTA did not apply retroactively, and there
was no need to decide "grave questions about Congress' [constitutional] authority to impinge upon [the] Court's appellate jurisdiction, particularly in habeas cases." 137 Additionally, the
Court depicted the DTA as a statute that delegated to the Supreme Court the task of sorting out "the very legitimacy of tribunals," while (assuming the Court approved military commissions) channeling "more routine challenges to final decisions
rendered by those tribunals . . . to a particular court and
through a particular lens of review."138 Second, the Court highlighted Congress's powers to "declare War ... and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water."139 As such it determined that the decision to constitute military tribunals resides
front the President, it is not our task to do so."' Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan,
770 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)); see also
DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 98, at 77-83 (discussing the incentives for all
three branches to seek war powers).
136. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Foreword,
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 81 (1994) (analyzing the relationship between Congress and the Court). Unlike a statutory ruling, to which
lawmakers can respond by enacting a new law, a constitutional ruling severely
constrains lawmakers in their available responses. Such responses might only
include extremely adversarial and costly techniques like jurisdiction stripping,
constitutional amendments, and changing the composition of the Court
through the appointments process. See id. at 42-43.
137. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2764 (2006).
138. Id. at 2769.
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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with Congress.I40 By contrast, the President has the "power to
execute," and thereby his inherent authority is limited to the
"conduct of campaigns." 141 Third, the Court further constrained
the President's power by narrowly interpreting the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and two post-9/11 statutes,
the Authorization for the Use of Military Forcel42 and the DTA.
For the Court, none of these statutes gave the President the
power to convene military commissions or to act outside of his
obligations to adhere to the law of war, including the Geneva
Conventions.l43 It did not matter that Congress implicitly
backed and explicitly recognized the existence of military commissions when enacting the DTA.l44 Instead, the Court resolved ambiguities in relevant statutes and Court precedents
against the executive.l45
In ruling against the executive and trumpeting Congress's
role, the Court depicted itself as a policeman-possessing jurisdiction to make sure that the executive was acting under congressional authorization but lacking the power to set military
policy. Hamdan contains no mention of the Court's past narrow
readings of its own precedents and appears to minimize recent
congressional efforts to empower the executiye.1 46 Instead, for
reasons mentioned above, the Court wanted to shield its decision by framing Hamdan as a fight between a power hungry
executive-willing to make policy inconsistent with lawmaker
preferences while, at the same time seeking to prevent the federal courts from reviewing this unauthorized power grab-and
a vulnerable Congress-the branch authorized to make policy
on military commissions, the Geneva Conventions, and the like.
To further insulate itself, the Court grounded its decision in
140. Similarly, the Court cast doubt on the President's power to unilaterally convene military tribunals except in cases of "controlling necessity." Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774. In this way, the Court sought to limit, without actually revisiting, its "controversial" approval of military commissions in World
War II in Ex parte Quirin. See 317 U.S. 1, 1 (1942).
141. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2,
139 (1866)).
142. Id. at 2772-75.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. This is the chief complaint of Julian Ku and John Yoo in their critique
of Hamdan. See supra note 5; see also Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference
and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 650 (2000) (positing that deference to
executive agencies' interpretations of ambiguous statutes is inappropriate in
certain contexts).
146. See supra notes 139-45.
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congressional statutes and not the Constitution.l 47 In this way,
the Court simultaneously rebuffed the executive and returned
the enemy combatant issue to elected government. To drive this
point home, four of the five Justices in the Hamdan majority
remarked (in a two-paragraph concurring opinion) that "[t]he
Constitution places its faith in democratic means [rather than
the unilateral assertions of any one branch]" and that
"[n]othing prevents the President from returning to Congress to
seek the authority he believes necessary."l48

***
For reasons articulated in Part I, the Court could have
gone much further in Hamdan without risking a political backlash from Congress. It could have ruled that the DTA unconstitutionally sought to limit the law's jurisdiction or that the Constitution guarantees that enemy combatants have access to file
habeas petitions in federal court. Congress almost certainly
would have acquiesced to such a ruling. My review of the
MCA's prohibition of habeas corpus filings has revealed that
surprising conclusion. There was, however, no need for the
Court to assert itself so forcefully.I 49 Hamdan still eviscerated
the Bush administration's military commission policy and
guaranteed Geneva Conventions protections to enemy combatants.15o And while Congress responded to the decision by enacting legislation authorizing military commissions and granting
the executive discretion in interpreting the Geneva Conventions, Congress's actions were hardly predetermined.l51 The
147. For additional discussion, see infra note 151 and accompanying text.
148. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined this opinion.). In returning this issue to
Congress, the Court rejected the government's claim that the President had
inherent authority to create military tribunals.
149. On the other hand, it is possible that a majority of the Justices
thought that Congress could strip the Court of jurisdiction or that the Constitution does not guarantee habeas rights to enemy combatants. In other words,
it is possible that the Hamdan Court went as far as it could in cabining the
executive's military commission policy.
150. See supra notes 45-47.
151. Early objections to some MCA provisions by Republican Senators
Warner, McCain, and Graham, for example, could have prompted legislation
that placed far more limits on the executive than did the final version of the
MCA. See R. Jeffrey Smith & Charles Babington, Detainee Bill in Final
Stages, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2006, at A4; Kate Zernike, Crucial Senator Says
a Few Problems Remain in Bill on Terror Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2006,
atAlO.
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Court remains positioned to strike down the MCA by issuing a
constitutional ruling on habeas corpus rights.
From the vantage of positive political theory, the Court
acted quite sensibly in using Hamdan as a vehicle to protect its
turf. All constitutional options remain open to the Court. By returning the issue to elected government, the Court's decision
was hard to condemn as judicial overreaching. Correspondingly, by inviting a democratic response to its decision, the
opinion gave the White House incentives to accept the Court's
decision and pursue explicit legislative authorization for its
policies. By ruling against the executive without explicitly expanding the Judiciary's power (by limiting Congress's power to
restrict court jurisdiction over pending cases or habeas filings),
the Court protected itself against executive encroachments
without exposing itself to political risk.
Finally, this Essay addresses two related comments-one
about public disapproval of the Bush administration and the
other about parallels between Hamdan and Youngstown, especially the Court's power to check an unpopular President. In
the winter and spring of 2006---when the Court was crafting its
opinion in Hamdan-the administration's handling of Hurricane Katrina and the War in Iraq, among other things, contributed to voter disapproval of President Bush. 152 With a forty
percent overall job approval rating,t53 the President did not enjoy the backing of the American people. Academics and media
elites likewise did not back the President and they vociferously
attacked contemporary presidential unilateralism.15 4 In Ham152. See Michael A. Fletcher, President May Be Running Out of Time to
Rebound, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2006, at A6.
153. See President Bush-Overall Job Rating in Recent National Polls,
http://www.pollingreport.com/BushJob.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
154. Academics voiced their opinions in writings and amicus briefs. For
criticism of executive unilateralism in legal publications, see Erwin Chemerin·
sky, In Guantanamo Case, Justices Rein in Executive Power, TRIAL, Sept.
2006, at 60, 60 (2006); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of
Permanent Emergency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699, 702 (2006); Michel Rosenfeld, Ju·
dicial Balancing in Times of Stress: Comparing the American, British, and Israeli Approaches to the War on Terror, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2079, 2082 (2006).
For academics opposing the President in Hamdan, see Amicus Brief of Law
Professor Louis Henkin et al., Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-148); Amicus
Curiae Brief of Louis Fisher in Support of Petitioner, Hamdan, 126 8. Ct. 2749
(No. 05-184); Brief of Law Professors Supporting Petitioner, Hamdan v. Rums·
feld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184); Brief of Military Law Historians,
Scholars, and Practitioners, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184); Brief for
Richard A. Epstein, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Hamdan,
126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184). In a sampling of seven leading newspapers in-
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dan, academics as well as professional organizations, including
bar groups and former federal judges, filed briefs defending the
Court's power to check presidential war making,155
Against the backdrop of widespread disapproval of the
President and his policies, the Court had even greater reason to
rule against the administration. Specifically, the Court often
takes social and political forces into account, especially the
views of elites and lawyer groups. 156 This is precisely what happened in Youngstown: an unpopular president waging an unpopular war prompted media outrage by advancing arguments
of executive branch supremacy to justify an unpopular act,157 In
eluding the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Miami Herald, Wall Street
Journal, Philadelphia Inquirer, Chicago Tribune and Boston Globe, the Wall
Street Journal was the only one to back the President's position in Hamdan.
See, e.g., Editorial, After Hamdan, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2006, at A10.
155. For a sampling of academic briefs, see supra note 154. Briefs filed by
professional organizations (opposing the Bush administration) included: Brief
of Amici Curiae Certain Former Federal Judges in Support of Petitioner,
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184); Brief of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York and the Human Rights Institute of the International Bar
Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(No. 05-184); Brief for the National Institute of Military Justice and the Bar
Association of the District of Columbia as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184); Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184). In addition to lawyer interests,
briefs supporting Hamdan were filed by former senior U.S. diplomats, retired
generals and admirals, and current and former members of the U.K. and
European Union parliaments. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Madeline K. Albright and 21 Former Senior U.S. Diplomats in Support of Petitioner, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184); Amicus Curiae Brief of Retired Generals
and Admirals and Milt Bearden in Support of Petitioner, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct.
2749 (No. 05-184); Amicus Curiae Brief of 422 Current and Former Members
of the United Kingdom and European Union Parliaments in Support of Petitioner, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184). A group of former attorneys
general (all Republican), however, did file a brief defending the President.
Brief Amicus Curiae of Former Attorneys General of the United States, Retired and former Military Officers, and Former Assistant Attorney General in
Support of Respondents, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184).
156. See LARENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE
ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR passim (2006) (arguing that Supreme Court Justices
are influenced by different constituents, including the public, media elites, and
professional organizations, especially bar organizations); Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347, 351-52, 366-69 (2003)
(noting the lopsided amicus filings in the University of Michigan affirmative
action case and arguing that the Supreme Court takes into account the views
of elites, elected officials, and other opinion leaders); see also Devins, supra
note 98, at 1340-42 (noting how social and political forces shape Court decision making, especially the decisions of the Court's swing Justices).
157. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 12, at 77-78.
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describing Youngstown, Chief Justice Rehnquist (who had
clerked for Justice Jackson the year the Court decided the case)
acknowledged that the Court operates against the backdrop of
social and political forces. For Rehnquist, "[Youngstown] is one
of those celebrated constitutional cases where what might be
called the tide of public opinion suddenly began to run against
the government, for a number of reasons, and ... this tide of
public opinion had a considerable influence on the Court." 158
Much the same can be said of Hamdan. The Court had a strong
incentive to protect its turf, and the prevailing social and political forces contributed to the Court's willingness to stand behind
Congress when checking perceived presidential excess, as the
Court did in YoungstownJ59
CONCLUSION: PREDICTIONS AND FINAL THOUGHTS
Let me be clear: Congress (or at least the Congresses that
enacted the MCA and DTA) does not want the federal courts to
second guess the military and almost certainly would have preferred for the Supreme Court to have come out the other way in
both Rasul and Hamdan. But that desire does not mean that
Congress is truly upset with the Court, willing to use courtstripping and other devices to compel the Court to preserve
Congress's preferred policies. Congress, for reasons detailed in
this Essay, supports judicial independence and treats Court interpretations of the Constitution as final and authoritative.
More generally, today's Congress is not especially interested in
interpreting the Constitution.
My analysis of the DTA and MCA supports this conclusion.
Congress certainly sought to limit the judicial role, but it never
threatened to challenge the Hamdan Court's authority to assert its institutional prerogatives. For this very reason, the
Court had incentive to hide behind Congress while attacking
the executive. Unlike Congress, the executive did want to shift
to itself power that would otherwise reside in the courts. Moreover, even though the DTA backed military commissions and
called for a limited judicial role, the Court could nonetheless

158. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT

Is 95 (1987).
159. The fact that today's Congress, unlike the Youngstown Congress, tacitly backed the President did not matter. The Court needed to find a way to
isolate the executive from other parts of the government. See supra notes 13345.
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claim that the executive branch was thumbing its nose at Congress without fear that Congress would call its bluff.l60
The question then becomes: What's next? The MCA will
soon make its way to the Supreme Court.l61 I expect the Court
to agree to hear a legal challenge to the MCA, and I predict
that the Justices will neuter the MCA's habeas provision on
statutory grounds. The Court passing judgment on the MCA is
to be expected; after addressing the legal status of enemy combatants in Rasul and Hamdan, the Court is too involved in this
dialogue to step aside at this time (especially considering the
Court's embrace ofthe rhetoric of judicial supremacy).162
160. For these and other reasons, the DTA and MCA are not at all incon·
sistent with my earlier claims that the Court should not fear Congress. See
Devins, supra note 2, at 1347. Just as recent legislative proposals to strip the
courts of jurisdiction on social issues are largely rhetorical endeavors, the
MCA and DTA are not threats to judicial independence. The courts can inter·
pret these statutes as they see fit and may invalidate key provisions without
fearing a congressional backlash. See supra notes 81-95.
161. On February 20, 2007, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld MCA
limitations on habeas relief by a 2:1 vote. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007), and application denied, No.
06Al001, 2007 WL 1225368 (U.S. Apr. 26, 2007); see Stephen Labaton, Court
Endorses Curbs on Appeal by U.S. Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2007, at Al.
In upholding the MCA, the two-judge majority concluded that Congress could
suspend the writ of habeas corpus for "aliens held outside the territory of the
sovereign." Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 990 (quoting Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,
502-05 & n.5 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). In so ruling, the majority did not
consider whether MCA procedures provided an adequate alternative to federal
court consideration of habeas filings. The dissenting judge did reach this issue,
concluding both that Congress could not suspend the writ without providing
adequate alternatives and that the MCA did not provide an adequate alternative. See id. at 1007 (Rogers, J., dissenting). Following this ruling, lawyers for
Guantanamo Bay detainees announced their plans to ask the Supreme Court
to hear an immediate appeal to the ruling. See Posting of Lyle Denniston to
SCOTUSblog, Detainees to Seek Fast-Track Appeal, http://www.scotusblog
.com/movabletype/archives/2007/02/detainees_to_se.html (Feb. 20, 2007, 08:00
PM).
On April 2, 2007, the Supreme Court declined to hear this petition for expedited review. Boumediene, 127 S. Ct. at 1478. Roughly three weeks later, on
April 27, 2007, Chief Justice Roberts (ruling in his capacity as supervisory
Justice of the D.C. Circuit) turned down an appeal for a rehearing of the April
2 certiorari denial. Boumediene, No. 06Al001, 2007 WL 1225368, at *1. Later
that very same day, lawyers representing Guantanamo detainees filed petitions for rehearing before the entire Court. See Posting of Lyle Denniston to
Detainees Seek Rehearing, http://www.scotusblog.com/
SCOTUSblog,
movabletype/archives/2007/04/detainees_seek_2.html (Apr. 29, 2007, 04:51PM).
For additional discussion, see infra note 162.
162. See supra notes 16--18, 120-27 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's practice of asserting its authority to pass judgment on constitutional
questions).
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I also think that the Court is too committed to protecting
its institutional turf, especially habeas corpus jurisdiction, to
validate the MCA. Indeed, the very factors that animated the
Court's ruling in Hamdan point to the Court's statutory nullification of the MCA's habeas corpus prohibition.163 The Court
continues to have an incentive to limit executive branch control
over enemy combatants and, more generally, the war on terror.
Moreover, Congress would certainly support such a ruling.
That, for reasons detailed in Part I, was true of the Congress
that enacted the MCAJ64 It is even more true today; after the

What then of the Court's April 2, 2007 refusal to hear an expedited appeal
of a Guantanamo detainee challenge to the Military Commission Act? See inira note 161 (detailing recent Suprt!nle CouJ:t action in Guantiinamo detainee
appeals). No doubt, the Court is not looking to quickly and decisively intervene
in this dispute. Justices Kennedy and Stevens (in an opinion concurring in the
denial of certiorari) concluded that the Court should follow its usual practice
for ordinary prison inmates and require "the exhaustion of available remedies
as a precondition to accepting jurisdiction over applications for the writ of habeas corpus." Boumediene, 127 S. Ct. at 1478 (citing Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S.
114 (1944) (per curiam)). The more difficult question, of course, is whether the
Court's refusal to hear these appeals signals that Justice Kennedy (the fifth
vote in Hamdan) is not prepared to overturn the D.C. Circuit decision upholding Military Commission Act restrictions on habeas relief. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Turns Down Detainees' Habeas Corpus Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at A18 (speculating that Justice Kennedy is not yet ready
to overturn the Military Commission Act). My guess is that Justice Kennedy is
prepared to issue such a ruling but sees no reason to do so at this time. Congress might moot the case by invalidating the habeas provisions of the Military Commission Act. See infra note 168. More than that, the Court might not
want to open itself to charges of judicial activism and supremacy by expediting
review of the D.C. Circuit decision. In Hamdan, the Court took pains to protect itself from such charges-returning the issue to Congress by ruling that
the military commissions were not statutorily authorized. 126 S. Ct. 2749,
2754 (2006). Before overturning (or severely limiting Congress's handiwork),
the Court has good reason to adhere to its normal procedures in habeas cases.
Indeed, for reasons detailed infra, the Court-even if it were to hear the
case-might bifurcate its ruling in such a way as to delay ultimate consideration of the legality of military commission procedures. See infra note 168. To
summarize: While it is hard to know precisely why the Supreme Court refused
to expedite review of the D.C. Circuit decision, the Court's refusal to quickly
and decisively determine the legality of MCA restrictions on habeas relief
hardly means that the Court will not decide this issue at a later date.
163. See infra notes 169-70.
164. Today's Congress, of course, would be even more supportive of a Court
decision invalidating the MCA than the Congress that enacted the statute. By
shifting control of both the House and the Senate, the November 2006 elections suggest that Congress and the American people would be even more accepting of judicial rulings limiting executive branch power. See Barry Friedman & Anna Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J. 123, 125 (2003)
(suggesting that the Court-before striking down a federal statute-pays close
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2006 Democratic takeover of Congress, a majority of lawmakers
would welcome judicial invalidation of the MCA's habeas provision_165 Correspondingly, since the ruling in Hamdan the
President's popularity has dipped even further 166-so that the
Court has additional slack to check the White House without
fearing political reprisals. As further support for the Court's
backing of habeas filings, elites and lawyers' groups oppose the
MCAJ67
A statutory, not constitutional, ruling seems likely because
the Court can rule that enemy combatants possess constitutional habeas rights without invalidating the MCA. Rather
than engage in open battle with Congress, the Court can conclude, as it did in Hamdan, that Congress delegated to it the
power to determine the reach of statutory habeas corpus. 168
attention to the Congress in power, not the Congress that enacted a law).
165. See supra notes 87, 93-95 (noting Democratic opposition to the MCA's
habeas provision); see also Toobin, supra note 87, at 54 (noting that a Democratic Congress would not try to countermand a Supreme Court decision invalidating the MCA's habeas provision and, as such, "the Court now has plenty of
running room to do the right thing." (quoting Professor Akhil Reed Amar) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
166. See Peter Baker & Jon Cohen, Doubt Shrouds Bush's Speech; President's Approval Rating Is at Its Lowest Since He Took Office, Hous. CHRON.,
Jan. 23, 2007, at A3.
167. For example, a brief filed with the D.C. Circuit by seven former federal court judges, appointed by both Democratic and Republican administrations, argues that the MCA cannot be squared with constitutional habeas corpus, because the "military tribunals may accept evidence obtained by torture."
Neil A. Lewis, Appeals Court Weighs Prisoners' Rights to Fight Detention, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2006, at Al5 (discussing ongoing litigation in the D.C. Circuit
challenging the legality of MCA restrictions on habeas filings). For a sampling
of similar arguments in the Hamdan litigation, see supra note 155.
168. Alternatively, the Court could avoid (at least temporarily) a ruling on
the constitutionality of MCA limits on habeas relief by overturning on narrow
grounds the D.C. Circuit decision upholding the MCA. As discussed above, the
D.C. Circuit concluded that Congress could suspend habeas relief for aliens
held outside the United States. Supra note 161. In so ruling the D.C. Circuit
did not consider whether MCA provisions could serve as an adequate alternative to federal court consideration of habeas filings. See id. Consequently, the
Supreme Court could overrule the D.C. Circuit on the applicability of habeas
rights to federal habeas filings. Such a ruling would send the MCA case back
to the D.C. Circuit. Such a ruling would also provide Congress with an opportunity to moot the habeas question by passing legislation overturning the
MCA's limits on habeas filings. Legislation was introduced before the D.C. Circuit Court's February 20, 2007 ruling, and the D.C. Circuit may well prod Congress to enact this legislation (subject, of course, to a presidential veto). See
Labaton, supra note 161; Josh White, Bill Would Restore Detainees' Rights,
Define 'Combatant,' WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2007, at AS. This legislation could
be enacted before any Supreme Court consideration of the D.C. Circuit deci-
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Specifically, the Court can hold that the MCA applies only to
statutory habeas filings and that enemy combatant habeas filings, in fact, are protected by the Constitution_I69 Congress, for
reasons discussed in Part I, would certainly acquiesce to such a
ruling.170
Whether my prediction proves correct, my bottom line remains the same: the Supreme Court need not fear Congress.
Lawmakers have little interest in asserting their power to independently interpret the Constitution. Attacks on the Court,
as I argued in these pages last year, are largely rhetorical-not
heartfelt. And when lawmakers have acted to limit court jurisdiction, they have done so in ways that support judicial independence-including the power of courts to nullify jurisdictionlimiting statutes. That, as this Essay has shown, is the lesson
ofihe IviCA and DTA.

sian--especially because the Court has refused to hear the case on a fast track
basis. See Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1478, denying cert. to 476
F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and application denied, No. 06A1001, 2007 WL
1225368 (U.S. Apr. 26, 2007). Moreover, if congressional efforts to pass this
legislation would be frustrated by a presidential veto, a Court decision invalidating the MCA would have the formal backing of Congress.
169. In rendering such a decision, the Court would not need to invoke the
canon of constitutional avoidance. Instead, the Court could rule that the MCA
is clearly limited to statutory habeas filings, so that the statute does not call
upon the Court to sort out Congress's power to restrict constitutional habeas
corpus. This is precisely what happened in Hamdan. In concluding that Congress did not intend to restrict Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Hamdan
dispute, the Court did not invoke the constitutional avoidance canon. Instead,
the Court concluded that the DTA statute applied prospectively, and, consequently, there was no need to decide "the manner in which the canon of constitutional avoidance should affect subsequent interpretation of the DTA." Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2769 n.15 (2006).
170. The November 2006 elections provide further support for this conclusion, as today's Congress is more likely to back judicial invalidation of the habeas provision than the 2006 Congress.

HeinOnline -- 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1595 2006-2007

